

**WEAK STATES OFF-SHORE -
PIRACY IN MODERN TIMES**

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Weak States off-shore: Piracy in Modern Times

Kerstin Petretto*

Contrary to popularly belief, piracy still does exist in different regions of the world and poses a considerable threat to maritime security. However, it is a phenomenon which does not occur on every busy sea lane. Waters mostly affected are those around states which have been marked with the label “weak” or “fragile”. Based on an account of contemporary piracy, its causes and facilitators, this paper will discuss the connection between fragile statehood and piracy. Furthermore, it aims at tracing down the specific kind of threats modern piracy might be posing for the international community.

1. Introduction

Ever since mankind started to go to sea, their ships got attacked, crews have been threatened, their belongings and cargo stolen. Those incidents have been labelled as piracy – an armed robbery committed at sea. The fact that these armed attacks in their essence actually do not differ from armed attacks and robberies on transportation systems ashore could not prevent people from romanticizing them. Heroic sagas, books and movies are proof of this. Another trait of piracy is that it is a phenomenon which is inescapably intertwined with the power and policies of states: States have either acted as active catalysts of piracy or their own instability has been utilized by pirates for their own means.

The phenomenon

Ever since the 14th century powerful states as Great Britain, France, Spain or Netherlands hired privately owned vessels and the respective crews to attack ships of their rivals with so-called letter of marques. Chinese merchants conglomerated to pirate syndicates, while in some state-like entities in the Caribbean or Southeast Asia piracy even used to be a way of living.¹ As soon as maritime trade expanded and increasingly became a global issue with lots of profit at stake, piracy was no longer and by no means acceptable. Rules were developed gradually to ensure the principle of mare liberum and secure trade routes. Rooting in admiralty law, international relations thus experienced a massive juridification and formalisation since the 17th century. The Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law of 1856 finally abandoned officially legitimized piracy.

Intertwining of piracy and states then...

However, this special way of making money always survived – and in recent times, with about two thirds of global trade being conducted

...and now

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¹ For a multi-faceted account on the history of piracy see: Pennell, C.R. (ed.): *Bandits at Sea: A Pirates Reader*. New York, 2001.

via maritime trade routes piracy seems to be experiencing a comeback and is again receiving more and more attention. Nowadays, the intertwining of piracy with the power of states is again becoming quite obvious. This time however, it is foremost in the surrounding of fragile states where pirates are threatening seaborne transport and trade and are hence becoming a concern for the international community.

2. Contemporary Piracy: an Overview

Main source: IMB Piracy Reporting Centre

Ever since the International Chamber of Commerce installed the International Maritime Bureau in 1979, ships are supposed to report attempted or actual pirate attacks. However, hardly any numbers have been recorded up to the 90s. That changed with the establishment of the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala Lumpur/Malaysia in 1992, which publishes its weekly and annual reports in the internet and advises ships on how to best face the threat.²

Steady increase of attacks

The statistics since 1995 show a steady increase in attacks with peaks in 2000 and 2003, followed by a continual decline. 2007 again saw a rising number of attacks: From January to December 2007, 263 attacks were recorded worldwide, an increase of 10% compared to 2006.³

Problem with statistics

Statistics of course are always a matter of discussion, same with regard to piracy. Variant estimates suggest dark figures about 20 to 70% higher than the statistical account reveals.⁴ On the one hand, not all incidents are being reported to the authorities concerned or the Piracy Reporting Centre. Reasons for this are multilayered: Shipmasters refrain from reporting because they expect that nothing can be done by the authorities anyhow to compensate for their sustained damage. This holds especially true for the vast amount of small fishing vessels, from which the dark figure rate of pirate attacks is estimated to be the highest. Furthermore, captains are aware of the fact the more incidents are reported, the higher will be the costs of future risk insurances for the respective sea routes.⁵ For somewhat the same reason, state authorities often do not report incidents that happened under their surveillance to international institutions: they try to minimize the risk of damaging the reputation of their harbour or adjoining sea routes as "piracy-prone-areas". Another reason is that there are two different "official" definitions of

² See <http://www.icc-ccs.org/prc/piracyreport.php>

³ Reports available at <http://www.icc-ccs.org/main/publication.php>

⁴ For a more detailed discussion on piracy-statistics see Murphy, Martin N.: Contemporary piracy and maritime terrorism: the threat to international security. Adelphi Paper 388, Abingdon, 2007, pp.22-25.

⁵ See *ibid.*, pp. 19 and p. 81; Berg, Dieter et.al: Piracy - Threat at Sea. A Risk Analysis. Münchner Rück/Munich ReGroup, Munich, 2006 (online: http://www.munichre.com/publications/302-05053_en.pdf).

what constitutes an act of piracy – by the UN and the Piracy Reporting Centre:

According to Art. 101 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), piracy is defined as

Definition one...

“(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:

(i) *on the high seas*, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;

(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place *outside the jurisdiction* of any State;

(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;

(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b)”⁶

The IMB defines piracy and armed robbery against ships as “*An act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act.*”⁷ This definition differs from the one above in so far, as it embraces actual or attempted attacks whether the vessel is berthed, at anchor or at sea. Furthermore, by confining the definition of piracy to acts “committed for private ends” the UNCLOS Definition excludes political motivated incidents or those committed by insurgents. Due to the variant of reported attacks, IMB recognized the need to include all of these incidents for statistical purposes, and applies the wider scope of definition.

...and definition two...

The existence of two definitions however gravely hampers efficient prevention and prosecution of piracy: On the one hand, it leads to an underreporting of incidents of piracy in territorial waters if captains and/or state officials act upon the UNCLOS definition and refrain from reporting them to the respective authorities. On the other hand, pirates can – and more often than not do – take advantage of this definition: They sail from the high sea to the territorial waters of states which are not able to guard their coasts efficiently; Since states usually are reluctant to permit interventions of external naval forces, and official admission requires complicated and lengthy

...hamper prosecution

⁶ United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (online: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm).

⁷ ICC International Maritime Bureau: Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships. Annual Report 1 January-31 December 2007. London, January 2008.

procedures, promising chases of pirate-boats usually end up unsuccessfully at the borderlines.⁸

Code of Practice
combines both

Although UNCLOS hasn't been adjusted according to these findings yet, the "Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships", adopted by the IMO Assembly in 2001 includes a supplementary definition of "armed robbery" to encounter these deficits. According to the Code, an armed robbery against ships means "*any unlawful act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of piracy, directed against a ship or against persons or property on board such ship, within a State's jurisdiction over such offences.*"⁹ As a result, the combined definitions of UNCLOS and the Code of Practice are consistent with the one of the IMB, which nevertheless keeps on fighting for one single definition in international law.

Causes and Facilitators of Piracy

Primary motive:
Economic gain

Piracy is a criminal act with the aim of economic gain. Easy and low-risk profit making surely is the main driving force for people to become pirates.¹⁰ However, the quantitative variance in occurrence of piracy in different regions of the world proofs evidence, that there are more variables which have to be taken into account as explanation for this phenomenon.

Busy sea routes...

The existence of busy sea routes clearly does foster the emergence of piracy, since numerous vessels with cargo loaded, oil tankers, fishing trawlers or yachts heighten the potential profit considerably.

...and suitable
geography do facilitate
piracy...

Furthermore, specific geographic traits improve the conditions for pirates: when ships have to pass straits or so called choke-points, they have to reduce speed and thus turn into an easy target for attacks. The same applies to coasts with off-shore archipelagos or islands. In addition, these surroundings offer adequate hide-outs for pirates and their boats.

...while conflict, disorder
and poverty can be a
major cause

Once these two factors coincide with continuing conflict, disorder and poverty in a coastal-state piracy is very likely to occur. Two aspects lead to this finding: on the one hand, when facing poverty and continuous disorder people quite easily can slide into illegality as a way to survive. Vessels loaded with money and goods passing the coast day after day provide a relatively easy opportunity for making some extra money.¹¹ Moreover, fishing-disputes are also

⁸ See Murphy (2007), p. 12.

⁹ Art. 2.2, IMO Assembly resolution A.922(22) on the Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships adopted on 29 November 2001 (online:

http://www.un.org/Depts/los/general_assembly/other_general_assembly_documents.htm).

¹⁰ See e.g. Murphy (2007), pp. 12.

¹¹ See concerning poverty in Nigeria, the Malacca Straits as well as South China Sea: Burnett, John: Terror auf See. Bielefeld, 2004, pp. 130 (Original in English: Dangerous

claimed to be a reason for piracy. In recent times, the Somali coast for example seems to attract more and more European and Asian fishing vessels with the aim of profiting from the rich – and unsecured – maritime resources in this area. They are thus running risk of being a target of local fishermen organized in gangs to protect their fishing grounds.¹²

On the other hand, in poor or conflict-driven states the security sector is usually very weak. Police and military are understaffed as well as badly equipped and hence not in the shape of efficiently securing the coasts. Guarding coasts is a very costly task, especially considering the length of coasts in some countries (as it applies e.g. for east African states) as well as the huge areas which have to be controlled off-shore. Furthermore, weakness of jurisdiction impedes efficient prosecution and law enforcement, an aspect which of course doesn't apply only for pirates.

As a consequence, these surroundings also offer a breeding ground for organized crime – and piracy. The range reaches from locally organized gangs up to international syndicates.¹³ While latter usually do have their headquarters in more stable states due to the need for reliable infrastructure, they hire local seamen and stakeholders for the practical work. In most cases, there is evidence of brinkmanship in military and/or police. The more underpaid executive authorities are, the more they will be likely to connive with criminals.¹⁴ Organized piracy is actually dependent on this kind of collaboration, since there is constant need for information on specific vessels' routes and the respective cargo loaded.¹⁵ In conflict driven states as Somalia or Nigeria, but also Sri Lanka or Indonesia warlords, private militias and insurgents fill up their budget by attacking and robbing ships.¹⁶

In some regions of the world, especially in Southeast Asia, another factor comes into play: a certain cultural acceptance of piracy deriving from a long tradition of this way of making money and defending home-grounds against foreign conquest.¹⁷

Together with a weak security sector...

...they provide a breeding ground for piracy...

...often reinforced by cultural acceptance

Waters. New York, 2002). For conflict/disorder in Lebanon and Somalia: Murphy (2007), pp. 10.

¹² Ibid., p. 31.; Berg (2006), p. 21.

¹³ See Burnett (2004), pp. 227 (referring therein to interviews with the IMB).

¹⁴ see Murphy (2007), pp. 16 and 36.

¹⁵ See Burnett (2004), pp. 289.

¹⁶ See for example: Murphy (2007), pp. 28; Amirell, Stefan Eklöf: Political Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: A Comparison between the Straits of Malacca and the Southern Philippines. In: Ong-Webb, Graham G. (ed.): Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Malacca Straits. Singapore, 2006, pp. 52-67. Concerning the recent situation in Nigeria see Reuters: Declare Nigeria a "war zone", says world ship union (February 8th, 2008) (online: <http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL08236572>).

¹⁷ See Burnett (2004), p. 25; Murphy (2007), pp. 17 and 26; Santos, Eduardo Ma R.: Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Philippines. In: Ong-Webb, Graham G. (ed.): Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Malacca Straits. Singapore, 2006, pp. 37-51.

Modus Operandi

The numerous ways of attacking ships can be derived from the specific background of the pirates. Somebody who is poor and just taking a chance uses different methods and means than criminals carrying out a job organized by international syndicates.

The International Chamber of Shipping thus differentiates between three types of attacks:

- Petty Theft
 - opportunity theft by persons who manage to gain access to the vessel, usually in port or at anchor, and steal anything handy such as paint or ropes;
- Armed Robbery
 - planned robbery, alongside, at anchor or underway, targeted mainly at money, crews' personal effects, and ships' equipment, cargo if possible, often carried out by increasingly organised, determined and well-armed gangs;
- Hijacking
 - Permanent hijacking of ships and cargoes with crews sometimes being murdered cast adrift or held to ransom. Stolen vessels are often used as so-called phantom ships after having been repainted, renamed and equipped with new documents.¹⁸

Types of vessels attacked

These differences notwithstanding, for the concerned crews all of the attacks are a massive and permanent threat, no matter on the type of vessel they are working on. Vessels which have mostly been attacked in 2007 as well as in the previous years have been containerships (53 cases), tankers carrying chemical products (52), cargo vessels (36), bulk carriers (32), crude oil tankers (25) and fishing trawlers (16).¹⁹

Increasing violence...

Especially alarming is the conceived trend of more and more armed and violent attacks.²⁰ Although less people were reported as having been killed in 2007 (5 compared to 15 in 2006, none in 2005 and 32 in 2004), the number of attacks with guns involved is again showing a substantial increase (72 in 2007 compared to 53 in 2006).²¹ The easy accessibility of cheap arms, munitions as well as speed boats with which vessels can be hunted seems to enforce this development. This applies especially for Nigerian and Somali coasts, including the Gulf of Aden. Here, pirates often have opened the fire while aiming at the bridge or the wheelhouse with the purpose of

¹⁸ International Chamber of Shipping: Attacks on Ships - background information. (online: <http://www.marisec.org/piracy/background.htm>).

¹⁹ See IMB Annual Report 2007, p. 15.

²⁰ See Scott, Richard: Scourge of the seas: piracy. In: Jane's Defence Weekly 42 (May 11, 2005) 19, pp. 20-23.

²¹ See IMB Annual Report 2007, p. 12.

stopping the vessel.²² In Somalia, the use of rocket propelled grenade launchers and automatic weapons has been reported.²³

Furthermore, hijacking of ships is on the rise. IMB reports that 18 boats have been hijacked during 2007 with all in all 292 crew members taken hostage, some of them for more than several weeks (2006: 14 Hijackings, 188 hostages). 11 of these incidents happened in and around Somali waters with 154 reported hostages. The 2007 report also states however, that especially in Somalia the dark figure again is estimated to be significantly higher.²⁴

...and hostage-taking

Sites of Attack

About 80 % of all attacks take place in territorial waters of states. Vessels take greatest risk when passing narrow straits, approaching the coasts of or going for anchor in the harbour of weak states. However, during the last few years pirates seem more and more willing and capable to attack boats on the high sea, especially around Somali waters. IMB thus advises vessels "to keep as far away as possible from the Somali coast, ideally more than 200 nautical miles."²⁵

Territorial waters and increasingly at high seas

During 2007, by far most incidents of piracy occurred in Indonesia, Nigeria and Somalia including the Gulf of Aden. Taken together these areas thus account for 41.5% of all attacks worldwide. For a reliable risk assessment however one has to differentiate the locations of attacks: While in Nigeria most attacks occurred around Lagos and the unstable oil-rich Niger Delta, piracy around Somalia and Indonesia is taking place along the whole coast. In Bangladesh and Tanzania all of the attacks took place at the respective harbours of Chittagong and Dar es Salaam.

Indonesia, Nigeria and Somalia top the rankings

A massive reduction of attacks can be reported from the Malacca Straits due to increased security cooperation between the bordering state authorities in the last years.²⁶

Major decline in the Malacca Straits

²² See Murphy (2007), p. 19.

²³ See IMB Annual Report 2007, p. 22.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 22.

²⁶ See e.g. ICC Commercial Crime Service: Reported piracy incidents rise sharply in 2007 (January 9th, 2008) (Online: <http://www.icc-ccs.org/main/news.php?newsid=102>); Murphy (2007), pp. 27.

Fig. 1

Locations with most incidents of piracy

Location	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Indonesia	121	94	79	50	43
Malacca Straits	28	38	12	11	7
Malaysia	5	9	3	10	9
Bangladesh	58	17	21	47	15
India	27	15	15	5	11
Nigeria	39	28	16	12	42
Gulf of Aden/Red Sea	18	8	10	10	13
Somalia	3	2	35	10	31
Tanzania	5	2	7	9	11

Source: IMB Annual Report 2007²⁷


As the regional distribution of incidents of piracy unveils (see Fig. 1), the most piracy-prone areas are the ones for which most of the above mentioned causes and facilitating factors come into account.

Busy trade routes with hardly any piracy

Since there are more busy maritime trade routes in suitable geographic areas which are not or almost not affected by piracy, just as the Strait of Hormuz, the Suez- or the Panama Canal (see Fig. 2), the interconnectedness with the weakness of states is rather obvious.

Fig. 2

Major Piracy Attacks and Major Chokepoints / Oil Flows



Source: Energy Information Administration (2003)²⁸

²⁷ Own selection of IMB Records: locations with more than 10 reported attacks per year between 2005-07.

3. The Connection: Weak states and Piracy

There is no official definition of what constitutes a weak, a failing or a failed state. Numerous and variant rankings are evidence of this.²⁹ However the definition or wording: What is unambiguous is that fragile states³⁰ are not able to perform their core functions vis-à-vis their citizens sufficiently. These include provision of security (controlling the territory internally and externally), welfare (provision of basic physical infrastructure, health and education) and legitimacy (warranty of political participation, legitimate decision-making processes, stability of political institutions, rule of law and effective and accountable public administration).³¹ Degrees of states' fragility can differ highly, not only between the states taken into account, but also within the state itself – pertaining to the specific functional sector.³²

While an all-embracing sustainable consolidation of a state will not be possible without successful implementation of all three functions, the effective execution of the monopoly on the use of force is a prerequisite for stability and fulfilment of the other two. People living in a violent surrounding are hampered of a sustainable and economic productive life. Furthermore, a fully functional infrastructure – including harbours, coastal creeks and waters of littoral states – is compulsory to provide for a high rate of productivity, economic growth, and workforce. If this system is in the permanent risk of facing violent attacks, costs for the economy can be considerably high.

As a consequence, when it comes to linking piracy and fragile states the provision of security obviously is the most important criteria under consideration. Pirates are just one among numerous and variant types of non-state actors of violence, which make use of and

Definition of fragile states

Monopoly on the use of force as prerequisite for stability

Pirates as one non-state actor amongst many...

²⁸ Stars do mark piracy-prone areas (own markings); Graphic of oil flows borrowed from: Rodrigue, Jean-Paul: Straits, Passages and Chokepoints. A Maritime Geostrategy of Petroleum Distribution. In: Cahiers de Géographie du Québec, 48 (2004)135, pp. 357-374: 364 (Online: http://people.hofstra.edu/Jean-paul_Rodrigue/downloads/CGQ_strategicoil.pdf). For a detailed overview of the worlds' strategically most important choke-points see http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/Full.html.

²⁹ For an overview of rankings see: Patrick, Stewart / Rice, Susan E.: Index of State Weakness in the Developing World. Washington D.C., 2008 (Online: http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2008/02_weak_states_index.aspx); Schneckener, Ulrich: Rankings and Indizes: welche Staaten gelten als fragil? SWP-Diskussionspapier FG8/03. Berlin, 2007 (Online: http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?asset_id=3832).

³⁰ The debate on labelling and/or naming weak/fragile/failing states is not the task of this article. The term "fragile" is therefore used synonymously with "weak" in the following and covers a broad spectrum of state fragility or weakness.

³¹ See Schneckener, Ulrich: Fragile Statehood, Armed Non-State Actors and Security Governance. In: Bryden, Alan/Caparini, Maria (eds.): Private actors and security governance. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. Zürich, 2006, pp. 23-4: 32.

³² See: Schneckener, Ulrich: States at risk: fragile Staaten als Sicherheits- und Entwicklungsproblem (SWP-Studie; S 43/2004). Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. Berlin, 2004. (Online: http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?asset_id=1708).

moreover challenge the already weak monopoly on the use of force in fragile states.³³ The territory of a state doesn't stop at its shores. It includes a belt of coastal waters up to 12 nautical miles from the coastline. As noted above, to secure this area, police and military forces have to be well trained and highly equipped. If they are not, it will be easy for pirates take advantage of these unsecured territories and carry out their job.

...not bounded to the sea...

Over and above, piracy is not limited to maritime issues. For working efficiently, pirates are not only in the need of fast vessels, they must have their bases and networks on-shore. This holds particularly true for organized piracy.

...but rather tied up ashore...

First, there is a constant need of information about which vessel passes where and when, how large the crew is, what type of cargo loaded etc. Secondly, accessibility of shores or anchorages has to be provided. Therefore, well guarded ports with strong security forces are not really an option – unless the respective staff there is either open for some baksheesh or even professionally involved in pirates' business. Thirdly, especially when vessel-, cargo- or oil theft is involved, pirates do not only need buyers for the stolen goods but also persons able to falsify official documents. The latter factor additionally clearly does link piracy to international organized crime syndicates.

...representing the tip of a wide-ranging iceberg

Pirates can thus be considered as nothing more than the tip of the iceberg within a complex network of organized criminal activism which can thrive in the midst of weak states and spread out further on.³⁴

4. The problem: Piracy as International Threat?

Whatsoever, even in the surrounding of fragile states incidents of piracy seem to be rather rare compared to the amount of goods being shipped through the oceans every day. Even if the numbers should be twice as high as the statistics reveal: considering the fact, that 60 000 ships do pass the Malacca Straits alone every year, piracy could easily be considered as negligible phenomenon. Still, since the most important sea routes for global trade pass by fragile states in the above given explication the potential risks should not be underestimated.

Economic costs

First, economic implications can get considerable high. This might not yet account for the whole business of global shipping. Compared to an annual value of about \$7.8 trillion the estimated losses of up to

³³ See Schneckener (2006), p. 27.

³⁴ Teitler, Ger: Piracy in Southeast Asia, a historical comparison. In: Maritime Studies (MAST), 1 (2002) 1, pp. 67-83: 79.

25bn don't really seem to fall into weight.³⁵ However, for the respective shipping companies and their clients piracy does indeed reflect on their account-balance. On the one hand, insurance premiums rise as soon as a sea lane is known as high risk area. Vessels can either take the risk while paying higher fees – or they can take another route if possible, which might even however be the much more expensive choice due to longer distances.³⁶ On the other hand, shipping companies do loose profit if vessels or cargoes have been stolen or ransom had to be paid. Also, delays caused by attacks themselves due to reduced speed, escaping-detours or the subsequent investigations which force vessels to stay berthed do incur significant losses.³⁷ Again statistics proof evidence, that this risk is not tied to the specific regions in which the attacks occur: countries in which ships were managed or controlled that were mostly affected by pirate attacks in 2007 were Germany (43 attacks) and Greece (24 attacks).³⁸

Secondly, there is a substantial risk of pirates causing environmental disasters. In many cases, pirates do tie up the whole crew while robbing and also leaving behind the then guideless vessel. If the attack takes place on a chemical or oil tanker and furthermore in a crowded choke point like the Malacca Straits or Bar El-Mandeb where approaching vessels do not have enough room and time for manoeuvring, a crash can happen quite easily.³⁹ This could imply not only a scenario of contaminated maritime- and coastal areas but also one in which a major choke point or sea route might have to be closed for a certain time for the purpose of cleaning up the damage. The economic effects of such an incident would not be negligible anymore.⁴⁰

Environmental risks

Thirdly, piracy can lead to a spiral of weakness in the respective state. It can considerably undermine the already existent instability of states when piracy is used as a way of living – not only by criminals but by ordinary men. It does encourage already endemic corruption when state authorities as police or military are underpaid and offered big rewards for collaborating with the pirates. Some-

Spiral of state-weakness

³⁵ Again, the numbers of the costs of piracy vary massively due to disagreements in which factors to include in the calculations. Peter Chalk estimates the losses amounting for only about 1 bn \$ per year, Burnett cites experts who estimate a loss of 16bn\$, other experts do expect the losses to come up to \$25bn. See Chalk, Peter: Maritime piracy: A global overview. In: Jane's Intelligence Review 12 (August 2000) 8, p. 47; Murphy (2007), p. 20.

³⁶ To circumnavigate the Bar el-Mandeb Passage when coming from Europe for example, the whole continent of Africa would have to be sailed around.

³⁷ A factor which does also account for masters not reporting attacks to state authorities. See Chalk (2000), p. 50.

³⁸ See IMB Annual Report 2007, p. 20.

³⁹ Most prominent example of a crash caused by a pirate attack is the collision of the hijacked tanker Nagasaki Spirit and the containership Ocean Blessing in 1992 in the midst of the Malacca Straits. See for a detailed account of the event Burnett (2004), pp. 149.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 164.

times, this collaboration goes so far, as to naval forces have been reported entering vessels and robbing them themselves. By providing the ground not only for corruption but also smuggling and illegal trading, piracy therefore can contribute to the growth of parallel economic structures which in turn will not only hamper considerably the stabilization of already weak states; They rather hollow them out even further.

Successful battle against piracy...

Apparently, contemporary piracy is not a threat restricted to the respective local area; While of course the residing population – first and foremost people earning their money by going to sea – do suffer mostly from this type of violence, it is a phenomenon which clearly does yield global effects.

...only offshore *and* on land

It moreover has to be put into the greater context of the discussion on fragile states. When generating effective anti-piracy-measures, this link imperatively has to be taken into account for not mixing up the causes and symptoms of a serious threat in the international arena. Fighting piracy will need much more durable and sustained effort within the respective states to improve their stability and to build up an efficient security sector – both offshore *and* on land.